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Inmate Name Tept-4 Vcr~o Id 
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D O C  No. ~ % 9 o 4 '  
Address P C7. &a k 14 
F I LED 
; 83707 
21WO MU 26 WI 9 90 
Petitioner P- 
IN TN[E DISTRICT COURT OF TKE JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
T E R R Y  V A V ~ L D  , 1 
Petitioner, 
c&#87 82472 
J . I  
) PETITXON AND r n A V I T  






i ) 1 
! ( . ,  The Petitioner alleges: 
i 
1 1.  Place of detention if in custody: S 't 
I 
2. Name and location of the Court which imposed judgementfsentence: D<4%pt'~+ 
3. %e case number and the offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed: 
. . 
(a) Case Number: cr(! 9 9 - 
@) Offense Convicted: / ) /. 
4. The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terns of sentence: 
a. Date of Sentence: - 1 b 
I -c;9 
b. Terms of Sentence: S- 20 v ezp-4 
i PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
\. Revised: 10113105 
PETITION AND AFFIDVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
5 .  Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea: 
@ Of guilty [ ] Of not guilty 
6 .  Did you appeal fiom the judgment of conviction or &e imposition of sentence? 
MY& [ ] N o  
If so, what was the Docket Number of the Appeal? 
7. State concisely all the grounds on which you base your application for post 
conviction relief (Use additional sheets if necessary) 
(a) /VCUJ ~x,-e ~ s + r a J - v  L/. s+det L , o n . c  
~ o . r ~ N t A P y  22  ZOO 6 
(b) - \3ea).a( c& c o v ~ r t (  - di- A ke, - L C  13 
- L~COAJAT,, - C ) C " / G L , S ~ ~ . / ~ /  e v . j l d ~ L a 1  
. . 
e 
8. Prior to 6 s  petition, have'yoa filed ivith respect to this conviction: 
a. Petitions in state or ~ederal  Court for habeis dorpus? mi, 
b. Any other petitions, motions, or applicatiom.in any other court? 
c. If you answered yes to a orb above; state the name and Court in which each 
petition, motion or application was filed: 
i PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 2 Revised: 1011 3105 
PETITION AND AFFIDVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
,C 
I 
9. If your application is based upon the faiIure of counsel to adequately represent you, 
state concisely andin defail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests: 
I 10. Are you seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, requesting the 
I 
proceeding be at county expense? Of your answer is "yes", you must fill out a 
I 
I Motion to ProceedGn Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
[ I yes [ ] N O @  N& F e e ; $  S I S - Y Y O ~  (4 
I C --. I 
I 1 I. Are you requesting the ap~oiritme~it of counsel to represent you in this case? (If your 
answer is "yes", you must fill out a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and supporting 
&davit, as well as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.) 
12. State specifically the relief you seek: 
PElYITTON FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 3 
Revised: 10/13/05 
PETITION AND AFFIDVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
13. This Petition may be accompanied by affidavits in suppog of the petition. (Forms r .. 
for this are available.) 
DATEDth i sxdayof  / V c ? ~ t ! x h ~ r  ,204.35 




Ter L . ] , b&g sworn, deposes and says that the p W  is the . . 
Petitionet in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this PETmON FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELEF are true and correct to the best of his or her knowledge and belief. 
etitioner -- 
STII)SCJ?JBED AND SWORN and AFFIRMED to fore me this a day of h 
PF,n'I'ION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 4 
Revise& 10/13/05 
PETITION AND AFFIDVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
13 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the f l  day of /V+ cQfi.lbpr ,20_03,1 mailed 
a copy of this PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF for thepurposes of filing wifh the 
court and of mailing a true and correct copy via prison mail system to the U.S. mail system to: 
, 
\\PI M@PCP County Prosecuting Attorney 
PE~TION FOR POST CON-VICTION RELIEF - 5 
Revised: 10l13105 
PETITION AND AFFIDVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
v- 
,' 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
A D 3  ss COUNTY OF 1 
zt'~.i V G V ~  1 , being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
4.0 $;\ lJr!y crcorne;/+'\d b-ne 
U ~ P  C r 'trclde, - v - r \ L : ~ \ O L C  
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST CONVICTION PETITION - I 
Revi~fl@k?% AND AFFIDVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
G 
-- - 
Furthe1 your affiant sayeth not 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
-r\lau-m&vc'3 20127. 
AND AFFIRMED TO before me this a day of 
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF POST CONVICTION PETITION - 2 
R e v i ~ ~ ~  AND AFFIDVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
3 ' 
DANTEL L- SPICXLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
Erik L. Johnson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Office Box I267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 799-3073 
I.S.B.N. 5995 
F ILED 
M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T E  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TJAE COUNTY OF M Z  PERCE 




vs . ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of recosd, Erik L. 
Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, and moves this Court for 
Summary Disposition and Dismissal of rhe Petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief as 
a matter of law pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-4906(c): This niotion is supported by the attached 
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition, incorporated herein by reference. 
DATED this day of December, 2007. 
n 
Erik h L. Jo son 
Deputy P osecuting Attorney / 
Vmold v. Sture 
MORON FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a f%ll and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY RISPOSrI'ION was sent via U,S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the 
following: 
Jerry Vavold 
IDOC No. 58904 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
D A E D  this day of December, 2007. 
Vavold v. State 
MOnON FOR SUMMhRY DISPOSITION 
D W L  L. SPlCKLER 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Ammey 
Erik L. Johnson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Post Offlce Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 799-3073 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TKE 
STATE OF IDARO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY VAVOLD, 1 Case No. CV2007-2472 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
VS. ) OF MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Respondent. 1 
Comes now, Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce Couaty, State 
of Idaho, and respectfdly submits the following Brief in Support of Motion for Sumnary 
Disposition, 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDUkAL IFISTOW 
Jerry Vavold pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code 3 I. 8- 
1508, a felony. 0p November 17, 1999 the Court sentenced McCormack to five (5) years .to 
twenty (20) years in the custady of the Idaho Board of Corrections. Vavold filed a Rule 35 
n~otion to reconsider his seatence, which this Court denied on March 6,2000. Vavold appealed 
on the Rule 35 issues. The Idaho Court of Appeals affmed the conviction and sentence on 
Octubw 27,2000. 
KESPONDFNYS BRlEF 
M SUPPORT OP MOTION 
FOR SWMhfARY DISPOSITION 
Vavofd filed the present petition for post conviction relief on November 26,2007 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Vavold alleges that his right to counsel and right to 
remain silent at a court ordered evaluation were violated pursuant to Esfradz v. State, 149 P.3d 
833 (Idaho 2006). Vavold seeks to have the Court order an evidentiq hearing and a 
"responsive pleading process." 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
A Petition for Post-Conviction relief is brought pursuanl to Idaho Code Sections 19-4901 
through 19-491 1. The application is a special proceeding which is civil in nature and distinct 
from the criminal proceeding. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676 (1983); Stare v. January, 127 
Idaho 634 (Ct. App. 1995). A post-conviction proceeding must comply with various procedural 
rules outlined in Idaho Code 19, Chapter 49. Sunmq dismissal of an application pursuant to 
I 
I Idaho Code $ 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule of 
1 Civil Procedure 56. Medrano v. State, 127 Idaho 693 ((3. App. 1995). Like a plaintiff in a civil 
.I 
I action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the auegations upon which 
j 
! the request for post-conviction relief is based. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 1995). 
I To withstand summary dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent 
I 
upon the applicant to tender a factual showing based upon evidence that would be admissible itt a 
I 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982). An application for post-conviction 
relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and 
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 
I 
I application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. M e h o ,  
I 
I 127 Idaho at: 642-43. In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by 
i admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to   is missal. Id 
Vuvold v. State 
WSPONDENT'S BRIEF 
tN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
r ' J  n C h  'Ah! 
Section 19-4901 ofthe Idaho Code specifically states two requirements that a petitioner 
must meet in order to bring a claim for post conviction relief, First, the petitioner must be 
convicted of or sentenced for a crime. Second, the petitioner must claim either (1) the conviction 
or sentence was unconstitutional, (2) the court was without jurisdiction, (3) the sentence exceeds 
a legal maximum, (4) the existence of material evidence previously unheard, (5) the expiration of 
sentence or unlawful revocation of probation, (6)  the defendant is innocent, or (7) the conviction 
or sentence is othenvise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore 
available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or 
remedy. LC. $ 19-4901(a). The state bases its motion to dismiss upon the following grounds: 
(1) the petition is untimely, and (2) the petition contains conclusory allegations lacking 
supporting evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Petition is  Untimely. 
Idaho Code $ 19-4902 provides that "[aln application may be filed at any time within ane 
(1) year &om The expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from 
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." "[Tlhe time linlit to 
file an application under the UPCPA is not renewed or extended by any . . . collateral post- 
judgment proceeding." FI-eernan v. State, 122 Idaho 627,629 (Ct. App. 1992). 
As noted above* the Petitioner was sentenced on November 17, 1999. Vavold appealed 
his conviction and sentence, which was upheld by the Idaho Court of Appeals in an opinion filed 
October 27,2000. Yavold had 42 days from that date, or until December 8,2000, to file a 
W h e r  appeal, which was not done. He then had one year from that date, or until December 8, 
2001, to f i e  apost-conviction claim. See LC. 5 19-4902. 
Vevoldv. Stale 
RESPONDENT'S BNEE 
PJ SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
A recent post-conviction case in Nez Perce County District Court aftirms that a post- 
conviction petition based on Estrada filed outside the one year time limit is procedurally barred. 
In Harselt v. State, the petitioner filed his petition based on Eslvada twelve years after the 
allowable time frame. Nez Perce County Case No. CV07-1348. The District Court f m d  that . 
Hassett's petition "is without question untimely." Id. at 6. The present petition was filed nearly 
six years outside of the time frame for filing a post-conviction application and is therefore 
procedurall~ time-barred. 
2. The Petition Contains Conciusory Allegations and Lacks Evidence 
Section 19-4903 of the Idaho Code specifically states that "[alffidavits, records, or other 
evidence supporting [the petition's] allegations shall be attached to the application or the 
application shall recite why they are not attached." Case law adheres to this section by citing to 
it and reiterating its language. Nielson v. State, 121 Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 1992); Bnruth v. 
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156 (Ct. App. 1986). These decisions held that petitions that do not have 
such affidavits, records, or other evidence attached, and give no explanation as to why they are 
not attached, are l~nsupported allegations. Id Such unsupported allegations entitle the court to 
summarily dispose ofthe application for post-conviction relief. Nielson, 121 Idaho at 780. 
No material issue of fact is presented by an application for post-conviction relief that 
contains nothing more than mere assertions. Nielson, supra. Mere assertions stem from 
allegations being made without supporting documentation (as discussed above), or when the 
allegations are conclusory in nature. fa! Applications for post-conviction relief that contain only 
conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an 
evidentiary hearing and thus, such unsupported allegations entitle the court to summarily dispose 
of the application. Id 
Vavold v. Stare 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
In his affidavit, Vavold states that the sentencing judge relied on the evaluation and the 
statements that he made and that he was given a harsher sentence because of the evaluation. 
However, Vavold does not mention what statements he refers to nor how these statements 
resulted in a harsher sentence. His affidavit contains mere conclusory allegations and 
insinuations without supporting evidence, 
CONCLUSION 
Vavold's petition was filed nearly six y m s  outside of the time frame allowed by Idaho 
Code $I 19-4902 and is therefore procedurally barred. As to aQtVavold's allegations, the petition 
contains conclusory allegations without suppotting evidence or documentation or an explanation 
why such evidence is not attached. such unsupported allegations entitle the Court to summarily 
dispose of the petition, The Respondent requests that the Court grant its motion for summary 
disposition and dismiss Mr. Vavold's petition for post-conviction relief. 
sJr 
DATED &is c/,\ day of December, 2007 
Deputy Pr secuting Attorney P 
Vavoldv. State 
ESPONDENT'S BNEF 
M SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
 nun^ n n l r n \ i i  i I hinn971h1 N I A O ~ : ~  I O O S  '11'330 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a M, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing BREF TN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was sent via 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the fo l lo~ i~g:  
Jerry Vavold 
D O C  No, 58904 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
DATED this day of December, 2007 
Vavold v. State 
RESPONDENT'S BNEF 
IN SUPPORT OFMOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
FILED 
PATTY 0. KEEKS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY V. VAVOLD, 
Petitioner, 
) Case No.: CV07-2472 
) 
! \ ORDER 
vS . i 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
Respondent 1 ) 
Jerry V. Vavold having filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief on November 26, 2007, without having requested the 
appointment of counsel; Respondent State of Idaho having filed a 
Motion for Summary Disposition and Supporting Brief on December 
24, 2007; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner Jerry V. Vavold shall file 
a Motion to Appoint Counsel with accompanying affidavit of 
financial status with the Court by January 18, 2008, if he 
desires the Court to consider appointment of counsel. It is 
further ordered that, if Petitioner does not wish to seek 
appointment of counsel, any opposition to the State of Idaho's 
Motion for Summary Disposition be submitted by February 1, 2008. 
ORDER 
Dated this 31St day of December, 2007.  
ORDER ORDER - 2 '2 9 
>L 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER was: 
hand delivered via cowt basket, or 
mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston. Idaho, t h i s 2  day of December 
2007, to: 
Erik Johnson 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
J e q  Vavold 
IDOC #58904 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707-0014 
ORDER 
Teresa A. Harnpton 
Idaho Bar No. 4364 
HAMPTON & ELLIOTT 
Attorneys at Law 
912 N. 8" Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Voice: 2081384-5456 
Pacsiniile: 20813 84-5476 
FILED 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
Mailing Address: 
P.O. Box 1352 
Boise. ID 83701 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN TE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY V. VAVOLD, 1 
1 CASE NO. CV-2007-2472 
Petitioner, ) 
1 MEMORANI>UM IN RESPONSE 
VS. ) TO THE STATES MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Respondent. ) 
The Petitioner, Serry Vavold, through counsel of record, submits this Memorandum in 
Response to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal in accordance with the Court's Order of, 
December 31, 2007. This Menlorandm is supported by a Motion to Take Judicial Notice and 
Affidavit of Jerry Vavold filed contemporaneously. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
Petitioner does not generally contest the factual background or procedural history section 
contained in the State's Brief in Support Of Motion for Summary Dismissal (herein* refemd to 
as State's Brief). Mr. Vavold appealed his sentence and included the issues of whether the PSI 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SWMMARY DISMISSAL - 1 
conraining unreliable hearsay influenced the sentence, whether the sentence was unreasonable and 
the denid of the motion for reconsideraxion. Mr. Vavold poinrs out a typographical error of the 
reference to "McCormack" as the defendant. 
Standards for Post-Conviction Action 
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature and the petitioner must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is 
based. Marriaez v. fiate, 143 Idaho 789,791 (Ct. App. 2007). The application must be verified and 
accompanied by affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations or indicate why the 
supporting information is not included. Idaho Code 519-4903. 
A petition is subject to summary dismissal only when the applicant's evidence presents no 
genuine issue of material fact !%at would entitle the petitioner to relief if resolved in his favor. An 
evidentiq hearing must be held if genuine issues of material fact are raised. Marrinea v. Stare, 143 
Idaho at 791. 
Response to hgument 
The State seeks summary dismissal on two grounds: 1) the petition is untimely and; 2) the 
petition lacks evidence to support the claim. State's Brief, p. 3. Mr. Vavold asserts the petition is a 
timely application raising the issue of right to counsel and Fiflh Amendment Privileges as 
announced in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (filed Noveniber 24,2006, released for publication 
January 22, 2007), (certiorari denied 2007 LEXIS 10333 (October 1, 2007). Further, sufficient 
E a c a  allegations were presented in the Verified Petition and as supplemented by this Response to 
preclude summary disposition. 
1. Timely Petition. 
The State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is predicated only upon Idaho Code $19-4902. 
Mr. Vavold concedes r h a ~  his perition was not filed under the strict time constraints of Idaho Code 
5 19-4902. The Petition is timely filed under a new rule of law that should be xetroactively applied. 
Mr. Vavold Bed his pro se Petition for Post-conviction Relief on November 21, 2007, 
pursuant to the mailbox rule. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). The Petition raised the limited 
claims of violaxion of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at the 
psychosexual evaluation stage of the trial proceedings and violation of the Fifth Amendment right 
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against self-incrimination at the psychosexual evaluation. Petition, p. 2. Mr. Vavold specifically 
cited 10 the Estrada decision iu his Petition. A fair reading of the Petition results in a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure of counsel to explain or assert M. Vavold's Fifth and 
Sixth Aniendrnent rights at the evaluation. Gr@n v. State, 142 Idaho 438,441 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Typically, a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within one year of either the 
conclusion of an appeal or expiration of the time for appeal, whichever is later. Idaho Code $19- 
4902. However, under the limited facts of this case, hh. Vavold's P&it.ion i s  timely filed as it is 
filed within one year of the Esfrada decision announcing a new rule of law, the earliest bigger date 
for the one yea* filing requirement. Arguably, Mr. Vavold would havc until the dcnial of the 
petition for writ of certiorari in which to file his Petition. 
In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court announced a netv ~ l e  of law with regard to the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the Court held that "no rdaho 
Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court case has specifically articulated a Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination as it applies to psychosexual evaluations Gar 
may support a harsher sentence in a mu-capital case.. .." Esirada, 143 Idaho at 564. It also 
announced the extension of the right to counsel by finding the psychosexual examination 
required by Idaho Code 3 18-83 16 is a critical stage of the proceedigs entitling a defendant 
to the advice of counsel regarding participation in the evaluation. Estvada, 143 Idaho at 
562. 
Although the Court stated case law indicated that the Fifth Amendment right applies to 
psychosexual evaluations, an indication is not a dictated result. A result is not dictated by 
precedent just because "the result the habeas petitioner seeks is within the logical compass of a 
prior Supreme Coulf decision" or because "prior Supreme Court decisions inform, or even 
control or govern> the analysis of the claim." Spaziano v. Singletcoy, 36 F.3d 1028, 1042. (11tlt. 
Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For these purposes, a result is dictated by 
precedent only if the court considering the claim at the time the conviction became final "would 
have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [the defendant] seeks was 
required by the Constitution." Glock v. Singletary, 65 F.3d 878, 884 (I lth Cir. 1995) (internal 
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quotation marks omitted). It is not a dictated result if the case's outcome was "susceptible to 
debate among reasonable minds." Bid. 
Typically, a newly annomced rule of law will apply to those cases pending on direct appeal, 
that is, the rule will not be applied retroactively to cases in which a conviction became final before 
announcement of the rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,311 (1989). There are two exceptions to 
the non-retroactive application of new rules: (1) the rule announces a substantive rule of criminal 
law or (2) the rule is a "watershed rule of c f i 1  procedure implicating the fundamental fairness 
and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Whorfon v. Bockring, - U.S. --. 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1180 
(2007). A new rule rising to the stature of a watershed rule must fiz wirhin a m o w  exception. It 
must prevent an impermissibly large risk of inaccurate conviction or sentence and must alter the 
understanding of the bedrock proccduraI elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding. 
Whorfon at 1182; Schviro v. Suwmevlin, 542 U.S. 348,357 (2004). 
While the United States Supreme C o w  has rarely applied new rules retroactively, Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, the exception is the right to counsel. 
Every extension of the right to counsel from Gideon through Argersingev has 
been applied retroactively to collateral proceedings by the [United States] 
Supreme Court. The holding of Gideon itself, which established the right to 
counsel in all felony convictions, 372 U.S. at 344-45, 83 S. Ct. at 796-97, was 
judged to be retroactively applicable in Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 847, 91 
S. Ct. 1089, 1090,28 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1971). The right to counsel at plea hearings, 
recognized in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193 
I (1963), was held to be retroactively applicable in Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 
I U.S. 5,6, 89 S. Ct. 35,36,21 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1968). The right to counsel at probation 
revocation hearings, announced in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 
19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967), was held. to be retroactively appIicable in McConnell v. 
1 I Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3-4, 89 S. Ct. 32, 33-34, 21 L. Ed. 2d 2 (1968). Tile right to counsel on appeal, recognized in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 
814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 81 1 (1963), has also been retroactively applied. See McConnelI, 
! 393 U.S. at 3, 89 S. Ct. at 33. Finally, Augersinger's extension of the right to 
counsel to any prosecution leading to actual imprisonment was deemed 
retroactively applicable in Berv  v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 29, 29-30, 94 S. 
i Ct. 193, 194,38 t. Ed. 2d 187 (1973). A score that is perfect packs punch in any 
1 analysis. 
I Howardv United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1078 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (discussion ofwatershed rules). 
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Likewise, the Idaho Suprenle Court's decision to extend the right to counsel to the critical 
stage of a psychosexual evaluation is retroactively applicable and should be applied to Mr. VavoId. 
Additionally, the newly extended Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination also applies 
to Mr. Vavold. The Petition is timely filed. 
2. Facts supporting claim. 
In the affidavit in support of the Petition, Mr. Vavold averred that he did not waive the right 
to counsel and requested counsel and was denied counsel at the evaluation. He averred that his 
sentence was harsher because of the evaluation. Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction, p. 
1. In support of this Memorandum, Ivlr. Vavold states that he provided derails regarding his sexual 
histoly to the evaluator and fhose were used to f o m  conclusions. Affidavit o f  J e w  Vavold. 
The district court: ordered a sexual abuse evaIuation in preparation for sentencing. Case No. 
CR 98-04465, Court Minutes, September 22, 1999 (Attachment 1). A trwcript of the sentencing 
hearing was prepared and a copy lodged with &e court as part ofthe Clerk's Record and Transcript 
in Case No. CR 98-04465.' 
During the sentencing hearing, the court stated it had "very carefully" reviewed the sex 
offendcr risk assessment evaluation prepared by Dr. Jeny Doke. Tr. 7, 1. 13 - 20. At argument, 
defense counsel requested the court sentence Mr. Vavold to r e h e d  jtrisdiction. Tr. 15, I. 10. The 
State argued that "[biased on the information contained in the PSX and Dr. Doke's repo*$ it is 
apparent that incarceration is an appropriate sentence in this matter." Tr. 22,l. 12. 
The court found rhat while it believed Mr. Vavold would do well on a retained jurisdiction, 
his was not an appropriate case for the program. Tr. 27, 15 - 19. The court specifically held that 
there was an indication of future conduct based upon the sex offender evaluation. Faced with Mr. 
Vavold's past record and the future indications &om the evaluation, the court weighed heavily the 
protection of sociely. Tr. 28, 1. 16. Thc court sen~nced Mi. VavoId to five years determinate and 
15 years indeterminate for a total of 20 years. 
From the court's sentencing determination, it is clear that the court carehlly reviewed and 
relied upon the sex offender evaluation to reject the retained jurisdiction sentencing option and 
A copy of rhe uanscript was prepared and lodged as part of the record on appeal. A copy has not been reproduced. 
Insread, a motion to rake judicial notice of the file in Case No. CR 99-04465 requens rhe coun ro consider those 
nanscripu, and pleadings in lieu o f  filing. 
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instead impose a sentence of five to twenty years incarceration. This  establishes a sufficient factual 
basis ~o preclude summary dismissal. 
Conclusion 
Mt. Vavold respectfully requests the court apply the new rule of Estvada to his case and find 
the facts asserted in the Petition and in the supporting Affidavit present a sufficient basis to deny 
summary dismissal. He requests leave to conduct discovery and a hearing on the claims set forth in 
the Petition. -. 
/ * day of Fehiuay, 2008. DATED this 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
sf 
I hereby cerrify that on the he day of February, 2008, I served a W e  and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document upon tlze attomey(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Daniel L. Spickler 
New Perce County Prosecuting Attomey 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: (208) 799-3080 
LC By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage 
at the post office at Boise, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s) - 
indicated above. 
<\ 
By faxing copies of same to said attorneyv) 3t the facsimile number(s) - 
indicated above. I j 
I : 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COWTY OF hTEZ PFRCE 




DAVE HOW ELL 
Date SEPTEMBER 22,1999 
Time 9:45 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
J 
Plaintiff, ) Docket No. CR 96-OW63 
I 
VS. ) .A.PPE?,UHCES: 
> 
1 MIKE SF@ 
1 For, Plainriff 
) 
1 ANTHONYAXEGON 
1 For, Defendant. 
SVBlECT OF PROCEEDlNGS: CHANGE OF PLEA 
BE IT KNOWN, THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO-WIT: 
DC# 2622 3455 2623 001-812 Defendant present with counseI. Others present Ebr change of plea 
rights: MacDonald Riggs and Michael Hight. 
Court advises Defendant ofclrange of plea procedure. Coilrt addresses Znfonliatian. 
DC# 2633 064 Defendant indicates name, date ofbirth, & SS?? are correct on Infomlation 
064 Cous advises Defendant of rights 
286 Court questions Defendant. 
294 Court addresses Information. 
1 Page of 2 'Pages 
COURT MINUTES 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
CR 98-04465 JERRY VAVOLD 
Couct advises Defendant of maximum possible penalties. 
326 Defendant enters guilty plea, 
364 State sumniarizes evidence 
41 3 COUIT quest io~?~ Mr. Aneson. 
Mr. Anegon responds. 
477 Coult questions Defendant. 
Defendant responds. 
Couit sets sen~el~cing on Nov. 17, 1999, at 10:45 a.in. 'ouri orders psi repor1 and sexiial abuse 
c\~aluation be sub~nirted by Nov. 12, 1999. 
Coilit orders S ~ e p l ~ e n  Lindsley ro perfom? the evaluatioii. 
613 Court conti~iues questioning Defendant 
782 Defendanr enters guilty plea again 
762 Coun presents comn~ellts. 
SO2 Court accepts guilty plea 
812 ~ o u G  in recess. 
BARBARA KASPER 
Deputy Clerk 
2 Page of 2 Pages 
COURT MMUTES 
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Teresa k Wpton 
Id& Bar No. 4364 
llAMPTON $ EL;LEO'fT 
Atforneys at Law 




PATTY 0. ':,'EEI(S 
DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defkdmt 
IN THE DE- COURT OP SECOND nn>ICWi D B m C T  
OF lPKE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TEE COUNT'!? OF NEZ PERCE 
1 
CASE NO. CV-2007-~72 
STATEOFWMO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Jerry V. VavoId, being first duly sworn upon o& depom and say. 
2. I make ?.his &davit upon my o w  in fodm and belid 
3. During my rrirninal case, ffle judge ordered the prcpwon of a & abuse ev&Uatia 
hr use at seatencbg. 
4. Tha dua to r  originally &ped wuldnd complete fbe evaluation in time fcn the 
sentmdng. I tben obtain& an evaluation fmom another psycho109;st, Dr. Jeny Dok to comply 
%&I the wu1t'5 order. 
5. My attamey submiW that evaluation to tae court 
6. I was not given a copy of the evaluation aRw my s W @ ,  
7. To the best of my recollection, the psychaIogist Ebc!adddetgils of my 6 idstmy Emd 
was used to m h  m1usions in the h e m  
8. Further ybur affianf &&not. 
DATED ehis 3 1 day of J a n w ,  2008. 
q SUBSCRIBm AND SWORN to before me, this &. day of~duary, 2008. 
G-CATE OF SERVICE 
1 %  672w- 
i &meby certify that on the a t d a y  o f 2 &  saved a true and C O I S ~ C ~  
copy of tht witbin and fwgofng document upon &le attomy($) named below in the manner 
mrd 
Daniel L. .SpicMea: 
New Pesot Co~nty Ploswating Attorney 
P.O. %% 1267 
Lmistoa,ID 83301 
Faosimile: (208) 7993080 
-2i- By lleposirisg copies of the same in the United States Md, postage 
pre-pa a* the p s t  &ce at Bo'w Idiho. 
- By hand delivfzing eopies ofrhe same %'the ofEica(s) of& a%mey(s) 
indicated above. 
p,\ - By J%X& copies o f m e  to said attorney$) at the EuxhdIe numbs(s) 
In6csxtd above. i 
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Fj LED 
Teresa A. Hampton 
Idaho Bar No. 4364 
W T O N  65 ELLIOTT 
Attorneys at Law 
912 N. 8th Street 




P.O. Box 1352 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
PATTY 0. VJI'EEKS 
C ~ B @ I S T .  COURT 
- 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE SECOND JWDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TKE STATE OF IDAlfIO, n\r AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY V. VA\70l;D, ) 
CASE NO. CV-2007-2472 
Petitioner, ) 
) MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL. NOTICE 
VS. ) 
1 




Petitioner, Jeny E. Vavold, by and through his attorney of record, Teresa A. Hampton, 
moves this Court to take judicial notice of the records, file and pleadings of Bate v. Jervy K Vavold, 
Nez Perce County Case No. CR-99-04465. 
This motion is based on the records and files herein and the Memorandum in Response to 
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
DATED this 1 day ofFeb111axy, 2008 i 
1 MOTION TO TAKE SUDICIAL NOTICE - I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certiiy that on the /day of February, 2008, I served a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney($ named below in the manner noted: 
Daniel L. Spickler 
New Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box I267 
M s t o n ,  83501 
Facsimile: (208) 799-3080 
A" - By depositing copies of the same in the United Szaxes Mail, postage 
pre-paid, at the post office at Boise, Idaho. 
- By hand delivering copies of the same .to the oEce(s) of the attorney@) 
indicated above. 
-\ 
I .  
By faxing copies of same to said atto 
indicated abovc. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
C O U R T  M I N U T E S  
Presiding Judge 
JEFF M. BRUDIE 
Reporter 
LINDA CARLTON 
Date February 27,2008 
Time 12:25 P.M. 
JERRY VAVOLD, 1 
1 
Petitioner, ) Docket No. CV 07-02472 
\ 
VS. 






1 TERESA HAMPTON 
1 For, Petitioner 
1 
1 ERIC JOHNSON 
) For, Defendant. 
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS: MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
DC# 4032 2953 Petitioner NOT present with counsel. Ms. Hampton present by telephone. Mr. Johnson 
present. Court has reviewed the CI-iminal file CR 98-04465, the sentence imposed and the Motion filed. 
3095 State presents statement. 
3452 Court has reviewed Memo. 
3462 Ms. Hampton presents statement. 
3675 State has nothing hrther. 
2683 Court presents comments. Court takes State's Motion for Summary Disposition under advisement and 
will issue a written ruling. Court schedule Eurther proceedings if necessary. 
3749 Court has criminal file CR 98-04465 and has not reviewed the PSI or the Sex Offender Risk Evaluation. 
The Court will have those documents removed under seal from the file. The Court will not rely on these 
documents to render his decision. 
3808 Ms. Hampton questions Court re lack of evidence issue. 
3827 Court questions State re timeliness issue. 
Mr. Johnson respzds. 
Court will address tgat issue in written decision. 
JANET KOUGH " 
APPROVED: 
Deputy Clerk 
1 Page of I Pages 
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IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY V. VAVOLD, 1 
1 CASE NO. CV07-02472 
Petitioner, 1 
1 OPINION AND ORDER 
v. 1 ON STATE'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Respondent. ) 
This matter is before the Court on State's Motion for Summary Disposition of the Post 
Conviction Petition filed by Jerry V. Vavold. The Motion came before the Court for hearing on 
February 27,2008. Petitioner Vavold was represented by attorney Teresa A. Hampton. 
Respondent State of Idaho was represented by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Erik L. Johnson. 
Prior to the hearing and pursuant to motion by Petitioner, the Court took Judicial Notice of Nez 
Perce County Case No. CR99-04465. The Court, having read the Petition, Affidavit, Motion and 
briefs of the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being klly advised in the 
matter, hereby renders its decision. 
Vavold v Stale 
Opinion on Post Conviction Petition 
FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND 
Petitioner does not dispute the State's rendition of the factual and procedural background 
in the case. On September 22, 1999, Petitioner Vavold entered a plea of guilty to one count of 
Lewd Conduct with a Minor in violation of I.C. $ 18-1508. Vavold was sentenced on November 
17, 1999 to five (5) years to twenty (20) years and placed in the custody of the Idaho Board of 
Corrections. A Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 was filed by Vavold on 
December 20,1999 and a Notice of Appeal of the Judgment of Conviction was filed December 
27, 1999. On March 6,2000, the trial Court denied Vavold's Motion for Reduction of sentence. 
On October 27,2000, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Vavold's Judgment of Conviction 
and the Order denying Vavold's I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence. 
On November 26,2007, Vavold filed the above-entitled post conviction petition asserting 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner Vavold asserts his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights under the United States Constitution were violated when his trial counsel failed to advise 
him of his right to remain silent at the court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Petitioner cites as 
authority Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). 
On December 24,2007, the State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and brief in 
support. On February 1,2008, counsel for Petitioner Vavold filed a Memorandum in Response 
to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, Affidavit of Jerry V. Vavold and Motion to take 
Judicial Notice. The Court heard oral arguments on the State's motion February 27,2008. 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD 
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a crime may 
seek relief upon making one of the following claims: 
Vavold v. State 
Opinion on Post Conviction Petition 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitutiol~ of the 
United States or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and 
heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of 
justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was 
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is otherwise 
unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; 
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902@) through ( f ) ,  Idaho Code, that 
the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon 
any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory 
or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
I.C. $ 19-4901(a), 
A petition for post conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. 5 19-4902(a) 
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the criminal 
action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709,711,905 P.2d 642 
(Ct.App.1995). "An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in 
nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,287,912 P.2d 653 (Ct.App.1995). However, 
unlike an ordinary civil action that requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an 
application for post-conviction relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal 
knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations 
must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included 
with the petition. LC. $ 19-4903." Fenstermaker at 287. 
A petitioner in an application for post-conviction relief bears the burden of pleading and 
proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and then prove by a 
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preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim for relief." Martinez v. 
State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct.App.1994). 
Under I.C. 3 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief may 
occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However, "[slummary dismissal 
is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. 
Fenstermaker at 287. "If the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must 
conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez at 
71 1.  "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any fact, is insufficient 
to entitle apetitioner to an evidentiary hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159,715 
P.2d 369 (Ct.App.1986). 
ANALYSIS 
The State moves for dismissal on the following grounds: (1) petition is untimely; and (2) 
petition is based on conclusory allegations unsupported by any evidence. Petitioner, on the other 
hand, argues the petition is timely because it was filed within one (1) year ofthe Estrada 
decision, which Petitioner contends announced a new rule of law that should be held to have 
retroactive application. Petitioner furlher contends the transcript of the sentencing hearing, 
prepared for the record on appeal in the criminal case, provides sufficient evidence to factually 
support his petition for post conviction relief. 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) provides in relevant part, "An application may be filed at any 
time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of 
an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." 
Petitioner Vavold's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals on 
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October 27,2000. Petitioner filed no post appeal proceedings. Under I.C. 5 19-4902(a), on 
October 27,2000, the clock began ticking on Vavold's one-year time period for filing a post 
conviction petition. Petitioner concedes that under LC. 19-4902 his petition would be untimely 
but, argues it was brought within an allowable time limit where a retroactive new rule of law is 
announced in a case. 
In Estvada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), the Court held that "a court- 
ordered psychosexual evaluation constitutes a critical stage of litigation" to which the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel applies. Estrada at 561. The Court held defendants have a right to 
at least the advice of counsel regarding participation in the psychosexual evaluation.' Estvada at 
562. Once the Court reached its finding on the applicability of the Sixth Amendment, the Court 
turned its attention to Estrada's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Court began its 
analysis by first determining whether a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination can be asserted in a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation. After determining the 
Fifth Amendment question, the Court analyzed Estrada's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
under the Strickland test2 
Petitioner Vavold contends the Estvada Court announced a new rule of law in regard to 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
and that the new rule of law should be applied retroactively. Petitioner directs the Court to 
Spaniiano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028 (1 1" Cir.1994) in support of his argument for retroactive 
application of the Estrada ruling. 
Of relevance to the instant case is the Spanziano Court's clear understanding that it was 
bound by the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 
1 The Estrada Court noted that it had not been asked to decide whether the Sixth Amendment right includes the right 
to have counsel physically present during the evaluation and, therefore, that question was left for another day. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,80 L.Ed2d 674 (1984). 
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S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Relative to the Teague doctrine, the Spanziano Court 
stated. 
The Teague doctrine bars retroactive application in a 28 U.S.C. 5 2254 [habeas 
corpus] proceeding of any rule of law which had not been announced at the time 
the petitioner's conviction became final. The Supreme Court has directed that "a 
federal court should apply Teague by proceeding in three steps." The first step is 
to determine when the defendant's conviction and sentence became final. Id. 
Ordinarily, a conviction becomes final for these purposes "when the availability 
of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a 
petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been 
finally denied.: Id. . . . 
The second step of the Teague analysis is determi~li~lg whether the rule the habeas 
petitioner seeks or upon which he relies is a new one. Caspari, 510 U.S. at ---, 
114 S.Ct. at 953. A "new rule" is one that "imposes a new obligation on the 
States," or that produces a result "not dictated by precedent existing at the time 
the defendant's conviction became final." Id.; Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, -- 
--, 113 S.Ct. 21 12,2116,124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993); Sawyev v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 
234,110 S.Ct. 2822,2827, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990); Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 
S.Ct. at 1070. Even if the result the habeas petitioner seeks is within the "logical 
compass" of a prior Supreme Court decision, Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 
41 5, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990); even if prior Supreme Court 
decisions "inform, or even control or govern, the analysis" of the claim, Safje v. 
Parks, 494 U.S. 484,491, 110 S.Ct 1257, 1261, 108 L.Ed.2d 41 5 (1990); Sawyer, 
497 U.S. at 236, 110 S.Ct. at 2828; Butler, 494 U.S. at 415, 110 S.Ct. at 1217; it is 
still a "new rule" claim unless the rule is actually dictated by pre-existing 
precedent. 
Spanziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d at 1042. 
As was noted by the Teague Court, "It is admittedly oftell difficult to determine when a 
case announces a new rule. . . ." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 301,109 S.Ct. at 1070. Later 
decisions by the Supreme Court attempted to assist in the determination by better defining the 
term 'new rule'. In Safle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), the 
Court stated. 
In Teague, we defined a new rule as a rule that "breaks new ground," "imposes a 
new obligation on the States or the Federal Government," or was not "dictated by 
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague, 
supua, 489 U.S., at 301, 109 S.Ct., at 1070 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in 
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original). The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt creates a new 
rule; it is more difficult, however, to determine whether we announce a new rule 
when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases. As we recognized in 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,412-414, 110 S.Ct 1212, 1216-1217, 108 
L.Ed2d 347 (19901, the question must be answered by reference to the underlying 
purposes of the habeas writ. 
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 488, 110 S.Ct. 1260. 
In Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. 407, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.ed.2d 347 (19901, the 
Court discussed the announcement of a new rule relative to the purposes behind collateral 
remedies: 
A new decision that explicitly overrules an earlier holding obviously "breaks new 
ground" or "imposes a new obligation." In the vast majority of cases, however, 
where the new decision is reached by an extension of the reasoning of previous 
cases, the inquiry will be more difficult. We said in Teague: "'The relevant frame 
of reference ... is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the [defendant] 
seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made 
available.' Mackey [v. Unitedstates, 401 U.S. 667,682,91 S.Ct. 1160, 1175,28 
L.Ed.2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in 
part) I.... 'The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose ... may 
quite legitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ 
to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in 
readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas 
petition is filed.' ... Given the 'broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on 
habeas,' ... it is 'sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the 
law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of 
[habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional 
interpretation.' ... '[TIhe threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive 
for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a 
manner consistent with established constitutional standards. In order to perform 
this deterrence function, ... the habeas court need only apply the constitutional 
standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place.' " Teague, 
supra, at 306, 109 S.Ct., at 1073 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added; some 
brackets in original; some internal citations omitted). 
Teague firther observed:"[I]n many ways the application of new rules to cases on 
collateral review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of [state] criminal 
prosecutions ... for it continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to 
keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing 
constitutional standards. Furthermore, as we recognized in Engle v. Isaac, [456 
U.S. 107, 128, n. 33, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, n. 33,71 L.Ed.2d783 (1982),] '[sltate 
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courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing 
constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a [habeas] 
proceeding, new constitutional commaids.' ... See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
[443],534,73 S.Ct 397,423,97 L.Ed. 469 [ (1953) ] (Jackson, J., concurring in 
result) (state courts cannot 'anticipate, and so comply with, this Court's due 
process requirements or ascertain any standards to which this Court will adhere in 
prescribing them')." Teague, supra, at 310, 109 S.Ct., at 1075 (plurality opinion) 
(emphasis in original; some intemal citations omitted). 
The "new rule" principle therefore validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations 
of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be 
contrary to later decisions. [intemal cites omitted]. 
Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. at 412-414, 110 S.Ct. at 1216-1217. 
The Court is not persuaded that Estrada announced a new rule of law. After Estrada's 
sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, he timely filed a post-conviction petition. In his petition, 
Estrada asserted his trial counsel was deficient for failing to advise him that he could invoke his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation 
despite his plea of guilty to the charge of rape. The district court concluded Estrada had a Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination relative to the psychosexual evaluation and found 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to so advise Estrada. However, the district court 
denied tlie petition after concluding Estrada was not prejudiced by the deficiency and, therefore, 
had failed to meet the second prong of the Strickland test. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial but reached its 
decision under a slightly different analysis. The Court of Appeals agreed that the privilege 
against self-incrimination applies to psycliosexual evaluations ordered by the court. I-Iowever, it 
found Estrada had failed to show his trial counsel was ineffective. The Court reasoned that. 
because no decision by Idaho's appellate courts or by the United States Supreme Court has held 
that a defendant may invoke the right against self-incrimination in court ordered mental health 
evaluations conducted for sentencing, Estrada's attorney could not be faulted for failing to advise 
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his client regarding a privilege that was not clear. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho at 561. While the 
language used by the Court of Appeals would suggest a new rule of law, the analysis did not end 
with the Court of Appeals decision. Estrada sought and was granted review of his petition by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, which saw things very differently. 
The Idaho Supreme Court found Estrada's trial counsel was deficient for the following 
reasons: 
The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
"does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but 
upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites." 
Application ofGault, 387 U.S. 1,49, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,558 
(1967) (noting the privilege may be claimed in a civil or administrative 
proceeding if the statement is or may be inculpatory). This Court's decisions 
clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes 
of a psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination applies. See State v. L a n w d ,  116 Idaho 860,871, 
781 P.2d 197,208 (1989) ( "The fifth amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to custodial 
psychiatric exams conducted prior to sentencing as well as those conducted prior 
to trial."); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-18, 868 P.2d 1231, 1233-34 
(1 994) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects a defendant against 
compelled testimony at the sentencing hearing in a non-capital case); State v. 
Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 387, 871 P.2d 801, 804 (1994) ("Following Idaho's repeal 
of the insanity defense, no statutory scheme remains through which a 
psychological evaluation can be compelled without threatening the rights 
guaranteed under both [the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 13, of the Idaho Constitution]."); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 
88, 100,967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998) (noting that "[ilf a psychiatrist or psychologist 
had been appointed by the court for purposes of a presentence investigation, 
counsel for Wood wouid have had the opportunity to advise his client of the 
possible uses of the information and of the privilege against self-incrimination."). 
The district court found that under Strickland, Estrada's attorney was deficient in 
failing to inform Estrada of his right to assert the privilege against self- 
incrimination. The judge's findings on this point are not clearly erroneous and are 
affirmed by this Court. Strickland sets an "objective standard of reasonableness" 
for judging whether errors in an attorney's performance are serious enough to 
render that performance defective. 466 U.S at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 
at 693-94. See also State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 5 1 1,988 P.2d 1 170, 1 185 
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(1999). "There is 'a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within 
the wide range of professional assistance.' " Hairston, 133 Idaho at 51 1,988 P.2d 
at 1185 (citing~r&on v. State 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)). 
Under Strickland, "[tlhe proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." 466 U.S at 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2064,80 L.Ed.2d at 693-94. Given the state of the law established by 
Estelle, Wilkins, Odiaga, Wood, and Lankford, this Court cannot find that 
Estrada's attorney acted reasonably under prevailing standards of 
professional norms. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 470, 101 S.Ct. at 1877,68 L.Ed.2d 
at 373-74; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217-18, 868 P.2d at 1233-34; Odiaga, 125 Idaho 
at 387,871 P.2d at 804; Wood, 132 Idaho at 100,967 P.2d at 714; Lankjord, 116 
Idaho at 871,781 P.2d at 208; Strickland, 466 U.S at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064,80 
L.Ed.2d at 693-94. While no Idaho Supreme Court or United States Supreme 
Court case has specifically articulated a Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination as it applies to psychosexual evaluations that may support a harsher 
sentence in a non-capital case, the case law nevertheless indicates that the Fifth 
Amendment applies to psychosexual evaluations. We affirm the district court's 
conclusion that Estrada's attorney was deficient in failing to inform his client of 
this right. 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho at 563-564 [emphasis added]. 
The Idaho Supreme Court found that, as early as 1989 in Lankjord and in a number of 
cases following Lankford it had clearly established precedent that the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination applies to court ordered psychological evaluations conducted for 
sentencing purposes. The Court then found that, because the law was well established at the time 
Estrada was ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation, his trial attorney did not act 
reasonably under the prevailing standards of professional norms when he failed to advise Estrada 
of his right and, as a result, he was ineffective in his representation of Estrada. 
The Court finds the Supreme Court's analysis well reasoned. The term 'psychosexual' 
evaluation is simply a contracted term used to describe a psychological evaluation that places 
emphasis on the sexual psychology of the individual. Hence, the Supreme Court's holding in 
Estrada did not announce a new rule of law but instead held that the law in Idaho was clear and 
Estrada's attorney was deficient for not having advised his client regarding this well-established 
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right. Applying the Estrada Court's analysis to Petitioner Vavold, his claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel was known to him, or should have been known to him, at the time of his 
direct appeal and should have been raised at the latest within the one (1) year time frame for post 
conviction claims under I.C. § 19-4902(a).~ 
While this Court is confident Estrada did not announce a new rule of law, the question of 
retroactivity will be addressed as though, arguendo, a new rule had been annomced. The 
Teague Court held, "[Wle now adopt Justice Harlan's view of retroactivity for cases on collateral 
review. Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new 
rules are announced." Teague at 310. Under the Teague doctrine, there are only two exceptions 
to the general rule that prohibits retroactive application of new rules of law to cases on collateral 
review. 
The first exception permits the retroactive application of a new rule if the rule 
places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe, see 
Teague, 489 U.S., at 311, 109 S.Ct., at 1075, or addresses a "substantive 
categorical yarante[e] accorded by the Constitution," such as a rule "prohibiting 
a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status 
or offense." Penry, 492 US., at 329,330, I09 S.Ct., at 2953. . . . . 
The second exception is for "watershed rules of criminal procedure" implicating 
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. See Teague, 
supra, 489 U.S., at 311, 109 S.Ct., at 1076 (plurality opinion); Butler, supra, 494 
U.S., at416, 110 S.Ct., at 1218. 
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 494-495, 110 S.Ct. 1263-1264. 
The Teague Court fitrlher clarified the second exception by stating, "[Wle believe 
that Justice Harlan's concerns about the difficulty in identifying both the existence and the 
value of accuracy-enhancing procedural rules can be addressed by limiting the scope of the 
second exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate 
? Because the Court finds the Petition untimely, it need not address the sufficiency of the evidence on the claim. 
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conviction is seriously diminished." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 313, 109 S.Ct. at 1077. 
Assuming first for the sake of argument that Estrada announced a new rule of law, the 
Estrada holding would not fall within either of the two exceptions that allow for retroactive 
application on collateral review. Estrada held a defendant may invoke his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination relative to a psychological evaluatioil, including a psychosexual 
evaluation. It further held a defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel if his attorney 
does not advise him of his right to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. The first exception to the general rule requires that a 
newly announced rule of law place a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to 
proscribe before it has retroactive application on collateral review. The Estrada holding clearly 
fails this test. The second exception to the general rule requires that a new rule of law provide a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction 
would be seriously diminished" Teague at 313. The Estrada holding fails this test as well as 
Estvada addressed a Constitutional right within the sentencing phase of a criminal case, not the 
guilt finding phase. 
Under the Teague analysis, Estrada did not announce a new rule of law, making the 
question of retroactive application moot. Nevertheless, even if, arguendo, a higher court should 
find Estrada announced a new rule of law, it would not have retroactive application to cases on 
collateral review under the general rule announced in Teague as it does not fall within either of 
the two exceptions that allow retroactive application of a new rule on collateral review. 
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ORDER 
It is hereby the finding of the Court that Petitioner Vavold's post conviction claims is 
hereby S U ' A R I L Y  DISMISSED as untimely. 
Dated this 7 day of April 2008. 
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I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION AND ORDER was: 
Lhand delivered via court basket, or 
L mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this day of April 
2008, to: 
Teresa Hampton 
PO Box 1352 
Boise ID 83701-1352 
Erik Johnson 
PO Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DlSlRICT COURT OJ? TI3E SECOND m I C I A L  DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY V. VAVOLD, 1 
1 CASE NO. CV07-02472 
Appellant, ) 
VS. 1 MOTION TO WAIVE PAYMENT 
1 OF FEES FOR CLERK'S RECORD 




The Appellant, Jerry V. Vavold, through counsel, requests this Court waive the payment 
of the Clerk's Record fee for apped in this matter. As grounds, counsel states that Mi. Vavold 
has been incarcerated on the underlying criminal offense sinceNovember 16, 1999, his 
sentencing date. Mr. Vavold originally retained counsel for the purposes of the criminal case, 
but Mr. Vavold's financial coildition has materially changed since that case concluded. Mr. 
Vavold has been incarcerated and unable to earn any significant income. His family has 
assumed responsibility for counsel in order for Mr. Vavold to pursue this appeal. 
MOTION TO WAIVE PAYMENT OF FEES FOR CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
05/20/2008 14:39 2033845476 HAI1PTON & ELLIOTT PAGE 06/06 
This motion is also supported by the Affidavit of Jerry Vavold to be filed in support of 
this Motion within ten (10) days. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code $19-4904, Mr. Vavold requests this Court enter its order waiving 
the payment of fees for the clerk's record and reporter's transcript 
D. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2a day of May 2008, I served a h e  and conect copy of the I hereby certify that on the - 
withim and foregoing document upon the attorney(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Idaho Attorney General's Office 
Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Ofice 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: 2081287-7709 
- By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, at the post ofEce at Boise, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office($ of the attomey(s) 
indicated above.' . . 
By faxing copies of same to said atto 
above. 
MOTION TO WAIVE PAYMENT OF FEES FOR CLERK'S RECORD - 2 
Teresa A. Wampton 
Idaho Ba* No. 4364 
HAMPTON & ELLIOTT 
Attorneys at Law 
912 N. 8'' Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Voice: 2081384-5456 
Facsimile: 2081384-5476 
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P.O. Box 1352 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IN TNE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DBTRIC'I 
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY V. VAVOLD, ) 
) CASE NO. CV07-02472 
Appellant, ) 
VS. 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
PLEASE TAJE NOTICE that the Appellant, Jeny V. Vavold, Eles his Notice of Appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a). 
1. Appeal is taken from the Second District Court, Nez Perce County, the I-Ionorable Jeff 
M. Biudie, presiding. 
2. The title and case number is as above. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
05/20/2008 14:39 2083045476 HAMPTON & ELLIOT1 
3. R e  Appellant is Jerry V. Vavold represented by Teresa A. Hampton. The 
Respondent is the State of Idaho represented by the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's 
Office. 
4. The appeal is taken from the Judgment ehtered on April 9,2008 denying post- 
conviction relief. 
5. The preliminary statement of issues includes the District Court comnlitted error by 
failing to retroactively apply Esbadav. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and dismissing Appellant's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging a violation of Appellant's Fi& and S i x t h  
Amendment right when trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to remain silent at the court 
ordered psychosexual evaluation. As provided in Idaho Appellate Rule 17 (9, the Appellant 
may assert other issues on appeal upon W e r  review. 
6. This appeal is taken as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 I. (a)(l). 
I 
I 7. Transcript: A hea6ng was held in the matter on February 27,2008 and is requested. 
8. Record: Appellant requests that the Clerk's Record include the following: 
a. Standard record pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28 @)(I) 
9. The undersigned hereby certifies as follows: 
a. Notice of Appeal has been served by first class mail on May 2, 2008 
upon: 
Idaho Attorney General's Office 
Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Ofice 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: 2081287-7709 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
i 
HAMPTON 8 ELLIOTT 
b. Appellant is not required to certify payment of estimated fees for the Clerk's 
Record or Reporter's T~anscript at this time. A request for exemption has been made to the 
District Court. 
DATED this 20 day of May, 2008. 
' /  .- .- 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY V. VAVOLD, 
) CASE NO. CV07-02472 
Appellant, ) 
VS. 1 ORDER WAIVING PAYMENT 
1 OF FEES FOR CLERK'S RECORD 
STATE OF IDAHO, AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
) 
Respondent. ) 
THIS COURT, having considered the Motion to Waive Payment of Fees for Clerk's 
Record and with good cause appearing, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Idaho Code 519-4904, fees for the preparation 
of the clerk's record and reporter's transcript are hereby waived. 
rl 
DATED this d a p  
O1U)ER 'TO WAIVE I'AYMIIWI OF FEES FOR C1.EKK'S 
KECOHD A N D  H w o I < ' r E ) < ' s  .IXAKSCIOI'T - I 
O R I G I N A L  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifl that on the 1 day o M e r v e d  a fme and correct copy ofthe 
within and foregoing document upon the attorney($ named below in the manner noted: 
Teresa A. Hampton 
Hampton &Elliott 
P.O. Box 1352 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5476 
Idaho Attorney General's Office 
Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: 2081287-7709 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, at the post office at Boise, Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attorney(s) 
indicated above. 
By faxing copies of same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number(s) indicated 
above. 
,. . , . 
/ 
. . Deputy Clerk 
ORDER TO WAIVE PAYMENT OF FEES FOR CLERK'S 
RECORD AND REPORTER'S TUNSCRIPT - 2 
Teresa A. Harnpton 
Idaho Bar No. 4364 
HAMPTON & ELLIOTT 
Attorneys at Law 
,912 N. 8" Street 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY V. VAVOLD, 1 
1 CASE NO. CV07-02472 
Appellant, ) 
VS. 1 AMENDED NOTICE 
.) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO. NEZ PERCE COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY, ATTORNEY FORTHE STATE; JEFF M. BRUDLE, 
JUDGE; LINDA CARLTON, COURT REPORTER. AND CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Appellant, Jerry V. Vavold, files his Notice of Appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a). 
1. Appeal is taken from the Second District Court, Nez Perce County, the Honorable Jeff 
M. Brudie, presiding. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
ORIGINAL 
2. The title and case number is as above. 
3. The Appellant is Jerry V. Vavold represented by Teresa A. Hampton. The 
Respondent is the State of Idaho represented by the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's 
Office. 
4. The appeal is taken from the Judgment entered on April 9,2008 denying post- 
conviction relief. 
5. The preliminary statement of issues includes the District Court committed error by 
failing to retroactively apply Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (20061, and dismissing Appellant's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging a violation of Appellant's Fifkh and Sixth 
Amendment right when trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to remain silent at the court 
ordered psychosexual evaluation. As provided in Idaho Appellate Rule 17 (f), the Appellant 
may assert other issues on appeal upon further review. 
6. This appeal is taken as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (aj(1). 
7. Transcript: A hearing was held iii the matier on February 27,2008 and is requested. 
8. Record: Appellant requests that the Clerk's Record include the following: 
a. Standard record pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28 (bj(1). 
9. The undersigned hereby certifies as follows: 
a. The Amended Notice of Appeal has been served by first class mail on June 
L, 2008 upon: 
Idaho Attorney General's Office 
Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 





Lewiston. ID 83501 
Honorable Jeff Brudie 
Nez Perce County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 896 
Lewiston. ID 83501 
b. Appellant is not required to certify payment of estimated fees for the Clerk's 
Record or Reporter's Transcript at this time. A request for exemption has been made to the 
r 
District Court and an Order granting the waiver was issuefi by'the District Court. 
DATED this % day of June, 2008. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY E. VAVOLD, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 















I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, 
documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28, 
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross- 
Appeal, and additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That no exhibits were marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 59 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said court this 22 day of July 2008. 
PATTY 0 .  WEEKS, Clerk 
, , By . , .~,  .,,. . ;~. Deputy Clerk 
1 . i 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JERRY E. VAVOLD, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v .  













I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript were placed in the 
United States mail and addressed to Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney 
General, P. 0. Box 8 3 7 2 0 ,  Boise, Idaho 8 3 7 2 0 - 0 0 1 0  and Tere 
Hampton, 912  N 8Ch St., Boise, ID 83702 this Y of 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this day of 
PATTY 0 .  WEEKS 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
